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Abstract—The loading of resources from third-parties has
evoked new security and privacy concerns about the current
world wide web. Building on the concepts of forced and implicit
trust, this paper examines cross-domain transmission control
protocol (TCP) connections that are initiated to domains other
than the domain queried with a web browser. The dataset covers
nearly ten thousand domains and over three hundred thousand
TCP connections initiated by querying popular Finnish websites
and globally popular sites. According to the results, (i) cross-
domain connections are extremely common in the current Web.
(ii) Most of these transmit encrypted content, although mixed
content delivery is relatively common; many of the cross-domain
connections deliver unencrypted content at the same time.
(iii) Many of the cross-domain connections are initiated to known
web advertisement domains, but a much larger share traces to
social media platforms and cloud infrastructures. Finally, (iv)
the results differ slightly between the Finnish web sites sampled
and the globally popular sites. With these results, the paper
contributes to the ongoing work for better understanding cross-
domain connections and dependencies in the world wide web.
Index Terms—privacy, tracking, cross-domain, social media,
mixed-content, Facebook, Google, TCP, HTTP, HTTPS, HSTS
I. INTRODUCTION
In February 2018 a Belgian court ordered the social media
giant Facebook to stop collecting data about Belgian citizens
via third-party sites, cookies, and invisible pixels [1]. These
tracking techniques are all well-know. When considering the
tracking of a user from a website to another, privacy issues
are present already with the Referer hypertext transfer
protocol (HTTP) header field often sent to a landing page
from a current page. Cookies and pixels help. This said, it
is JavaScript that supply most of the dynamic functionality
of contemporary websites—and likely delivers most of the
privacy violations and security issues [2], [3]. Potential se-
curity issues are evident already because external JavaScript
has full privileges within the requesting website with few
exceptions [4]. It also the JavaScript content loaded from
Facebook’s servers that raises privacy concerns when visiting
conventional websites that incorporate innocent-looking web
elements such as Facebook-buttons [5], [6]. These elements
can be linked to two fundamental theoretical concepts.
The first is the concept of forced trust, which refers to
situations in which users have no choice or opportunity to
affect information systems—including even the choice to (not)
use a given system [7]. Given that Facebook-buttons are
commonly placed even on the websites of law enforcement
agencies and online banking sites, a user has practically no
choice but to accept the possibility that traces are left to
social media platforms upon paying bills or contacting a police
officer. The second concept is implicit trust, which refers to
situations in which websites’ operators are implicitly trusting
unknown third-parties by explicitly trusting known parties. In
particular, the claim is that “websites operators no longer know
who they are trusting because external services load implicitly
trusted content from third parties that are unknown to the main
site operator” [8]. Although the claim may be provocative to
some extent, the theoretical implications are vicious.
When the forced and implicit trust are combined, it is
not difficult to draw intriguing theoretical scenarios about the
implications. As an example: a user (citizen) is forced to trust
an online information system of a law enforcement agency,
the agency’s system is explicitly trusting content loaded from a
known party, and the known party is loading additional content
from a party unknown to the agency and the user—hence, the
user is forced to trust an unknown party because the agency’s
system is implicitly trusting the unknown party. The scheme
in Fig. 1 illustrates these two theoretical concepts further. In
this simple scheme, a user visits a website that contains a
known dependency to another website. Once the user’s client
requests the dependency from the known website, this website
makes a further server-side request [9] to a third-party whose
response is subsequently delivered to the client. Thus, neither
the client nor the operator of the website necessarily know the






Fig. 1. An Example of Implicit and Forced Trust
Motivated by analogous theoretical scenarios and more
traditional privacy questions, there has recently been an in-
creasing interest to empirically examine dependencies between
websites [5], [8], [10]. While new questions related to third-
parties have emerged with social media [3], the empirical
research in this domain has its roots in the long-standing






















questions related to web advertisements, user tracking, and
the never-ending “ad-blocking wars” [11], [12], [13]. This is
also the domain to which this paper contributes with the focus
on TCP connections and Finnish websites. Although this low-
level focus allows to only observe domain names, Internet
protocol addresses, and ports, it should be kept in mind that
much more information is leaked with cross-domain connec-
tions. When the leaks are combined with geolocation tracking
and browser fingerprinting, identifying unique users is likely
easy particularly in small countries such as Finland. Given
these remarks, four research questions (RQs) are examined:
RQ1 How common are cross-domain TCP connections when
paying visits to popular world wide websites?
RQ2 How common is mixed-content web delivery that uses
both HTTP and HTTPS (a.k.a. HTTP over SSL/TLS)?
RQ3 When paying visits to popular world wide websites, how
common are involuntary cross-domain connections to
social media platforms and advertisement domains?
RQ4 Do the answers to RQ1, RQ2, and RQ3 differ between
popular Finnish websites and globally popular sites?
To answer to these four questions, the paper proceeds by
introducing the dataset in Section II. Results are presented in
Section III, and discussion follows in the final Section IV.
II. DATA
In what follows, the empirical sample is elaborated by
discussing the data collection routine and the domains queried.
A. Queries and Captures
There are two common approaches for collecting and
quantifying cross-domain information. The first active ap-
proach uses headless browsers, browser plugins, or proxies
alongside JavaScript instrumentation, hypertext parsing, and
related means [5], [8], [12], [14]. The second passive approach
relies on HTTP header information and lower-level network
traces [10], [15], [16]. The passive approach is used in this
paper: before launching a query with a web browser, the
classical tcpdump program [17] is started for capturing
the initial synchronization (SYN) phase in the three-way
handshake used to establish new TCP connections. All other
packets are disregarded. While the C&Q routine illustrated in
Fig. 2 is simple, it is idiot-proof in the sense that all new TCP
connections are guaranteed to be captured, which would not





Wait 15 secondsStop query
Stop capture Wait 3 seconds
Fig. 2. A Simple Routine for Capturing & Querying (C&Q)
The querying was done with Firefox 58.0.1. The browser’s
default settings were used with the exception of configurations
needed to exclude all connections initiated by default. These
include telemetry pings to Mozilla’s servers and different
connections related to safe browsing and malicious websites.
After each query, all Firefox-specific data was flushed, sans
the noted configurations. Due to the dynamic nature of the
contemporary Web, each query was followed by a fifteen sec-
ond delay. This delay is sufficient to ensure that full contents
were loaded, including dynamic content generated through
JavaScript. It should be further noted that name resolution was
also left for tcpdump, which in this case uses the live domain
name system (DNS) through a resolver provided by a local
Internet service provider. Before running the C&Q routine,
the Linux operating system was also configured to limit the
retries for TCP-SYN packets to one. Even with this precaution,
a small possibility of double-counting must be acknowledged.
B. Samples
Two domain name lists are used for the data collection with
the C&Q routine. The first list contains the top-10000 popular
unique second-level domains extracted from a larger list made
available by Cisco [18]. The second list is based on previous
research [19] on Finnish websites; the list contains a little
over two hundred popular websites that serve content primarily
in the Finnish language. Unlike Cisco’s list based on the
volume of DNS traffic in the global Internet, the Finnish list is
compiled by a market research company [20] for the explicit
goal of ranking Finnish websites. The ranking is done with





Domains (websites) 210 9216
Connections (TCP-SYNs) 18634 307516
Connections to ports 6∈ {80, 443} 0 112
Both lists were pre-processed by transforming the domain
names into second-level domains. This commonly used ma-
nipulation (e.g., [13]) is both a reasonable simplification and
a necessity due to the DNS-based rankings in the Cisco
sample. For instance, google.com takes the fourth place
and www.google.com the fifth place in the list, but for
the purposes of this paper, the two domains are equal. Given
this manipulation, over nine thousand successful queries were
made to the (second-level) domains in the Cisco sample. As
can be concluded already from the numbers in Table I, these
queries required a very large amount of new TCP connections.
III. RESULTS
The empirical results are presented consecutively by consid-
ering the answers to the three research questions RQ1, RQ2,
and RQ3. The answer to RQ4 is contemplated along the way.
A. Cross-Domain Connections (RQ1)
If one term should be picked for describing the infrastruc-
ture side of today’s Web, cross-domain dependencies would
be a good choice. According to recent estimates based on the
Alexa top-million sites, over 90% of popular sites have depen-
dencies to external domains, the median of external resources
loaded is 73, about two thirds of all resources are loaded
from third-parties, and perhaps most strikingly, these cross-
domain dependencies largely trace only to four technology
companies [8]. Three of these companies—Google, Facebook,
and Twitter—are also attracting a large share of the speculative
investments for web technologies [21]. These general insights
about cross-domain dependencies and their concentration pro-
vide a good way to start the empirical analysis.
In theory, the same-origin policy [22] could be used for
quantifying cross-domain connections. However, as the data
captured only contains traces about TCP connections initiated,
a more relaxed definition is used. Thus, for each domain
queried, a cross-domain connection is defined simply as a TCP
packet with a SYN flag sent to a domain other than the domain
queried. As the domains queried refer to second-level domain
names, also the comparison is done based on second-level
domain names. It should be further noted that the definition is
rather lax because many popular domains are aliased via DNS
to content delivery networks (CDNs) and cloud services. For
instance, at the time of writing, the Finnish domain yle.fi
had eight IPv4 addresses, all of which but one pointed to
subdomains of Amazon’s cloudfront.net according to
reverse (PTR) DNS lookups. Therefore, as many as 93% of
the TCP connections initiated when querying yle.fi are
classified as being cross-domain, although, in a sense, the
connections to cloudfront.net might not be counted as
cross-domain connections because the primary delivery is done
through Amazon. While keeping this point in mind, the results
can be summarized with the two histograms shown in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 3. Cross-Domain TCP Connections Initiated
The amount of new cross-domain connections initiated is
substantial: the median is 19 in the Cisco sample and as much
as 80 in the Finnish sample. In both samples, some of the do-
mains queried entailed even up to 250 cross-domain TCP con-
nections. These numbers are substantial because the so-called
HTTP/1.1 keep-alive option allows to load multiple resources
without initiating new TCP connections. The apparent differ-
ence between the samples is also interesting. One explanation
relates to the unequal sample sizes: if more Finnish domains
would be queried, the results might eventually converge toward
a long-tailed distribution seen in the Cisco sample. Another,
competing explanation relates to the fact that most of the third-
party web resources are hosted from the United States [12].
Furthermore: unlike many of the domains in the Cisco sample,
the Finnish domains do not have their own globally operating
CDNs or cloud infrastructures, which increases the amount of
cross-domain connections observed in the Finnish sample.
B. Mixed Delivery (RQ2)
To summarize the extent of mixed content delivery, the
amount of new HTTPS connections is approximated by count-
ing the number of connections initiated through the default
port 443. The per-domain percentage share of these connec-
tions to all TCP-SYNs sent is visualized in Fig. 4 by using
the empirical cumulative distribution function (ECDF).
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Fig. 4. Mixed Connections Initiated
Both samples indicate that HTTPS is widely used in the
current Web: the medians are 98% and 88% in the Finnish
and Cisco samples. Thus, on average, the encryption situation
is better among popular Finnish domains compared to the
globally popular domains. Interestingly, however, none of the
Finnish domains reach the maximum of 100%, meaning that
at least one HTTP connection was required for a redirection
from HTTP to HTTPS. In contrast, all connections were
initiated through HTTPS for many domains in the Cisco
sample. A possible explanation traces to a list loaded by
Firefox [23] to counter a bootstrap problem [14] by ensuring
that also initial connections are encrypted and comply with
the HTTP strict transport security (HSTS) standard [24]. In
essence, HSTS can be used to instruct browsers to transform
insecure (http://...) links to secure (https://...)
ones. According to the results shown in Fig. 4, a wider server-
side adoption of HSTS would be welcome on the client-side.
That is, both samples contain many domains with a large
share of mixed content delivery. Although the data captured
does not allow to speculate about the content transmitted, most
of these deliveries are presumably images, cascading style
sheets, and related elements loaded particularly from CDNs.
Security risks are a lesser concern for such content. But when
also JavaScript is loaded either from CDNs or other third-
party domains via plain HTTP, there is a risk of a man-in-the-
middle attack scenario [8]. Cookie stealing, request forgery,
and sensitive information leaks are also possible [14]. Given
that bugs occur during development and mistakes are made
during maintenance, the risks may be real for the few observed
websites that try to tightrope between HTTP and HTTPS
instead of delivering everything through the latter protocol.
C. Advertisers and Social Media (RQ3)
For providing a tentative answer to RQ3, the cross-domain
connections initiated are compared against two so-called ad-
blocking lists [25], [26], and two lists on the domains owned
and used by Facebook and Google [27]. It should be remarked
that particularly the ad-blocking lists contain many problems,
including the manual maintenance [11] and the variance be-
tween lists [12], [13]. The two lists used should still provide a
reasonable approximation on the prevalence of advertisement
servers among the servers to which new cross-domain TCP
connections were initiated. As has been common [16], the
matching is again done based on second-level domain names.
The median of cross-domain connections to ad-servers is
only two in the Finnish sample and zero in the Cisco sample.
However, about 54% of the domains in the Finnish sample
and 19% of the globally popular domains entailed at least one
connection to a domain serving advertisements. Particularly
the high share in the Finnish sample is noteworthy. The ex-
planation presumably relates to the fact that the most popular
Finnish sites are owned by media companies whose revenues
are partially dependent on the web advertisements served.
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Fig. 5. Mixed Connections to Advertisement Domains
Another point is that almost all of the connections to adver-
tisement domains occurred through HTTPS (see Fig. 5). While
these shares are much higher than what has been observed
in the past, the conclusion remains identical: also advertisers
follow the general HTTPS adoption trends [10], [16]. Fur-
thermore, the most common advertisement domains diverge
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Fig. 7. Cross-Domain TCP Connections Initiated to Facebook and Google
is expected due to geographic market structures in the web
advertisement industry, the results differ also from a cookie
sample recently collected from the same Finnish domains [19].
The reason may relate to so-called ad-exchanges that act as
brokers between website owners and advertisement companies.
Consequently, the amount of advertisements displayed on a
website may remain relatively constant in the short-run, but
the actual domains from which these are served may vary.
As can be seen from the final Fig. 7, it is not neces-
sarily the web advertisements that raise the largest privacy
concerns, however. Clearly over a half of the domains in
the Finnish sample entailed at least one TCP connection
to Facebook’s and Google’s servers. While there are again
differences between the two samples, the shape of the four
distributions is similar; at the tails, there are domains that
initiate even over forty cross-domain connections toward
Google. The rates are lower but still substantial for Facebook.
Insofar as privacy is a concern for users, it is not necessarily
google-analytics.com and doubleclick.net that
users should worry about. Arguably, it is rather the loading
of fonts, images, scripts, and other web resources from cloud
services, CDNs, and other middlemen of the current Web.
IV. DISCUSSION
This paper examined cross-domain TCP connections initi-
ated when visiting popular websites. To answer (A) to the four
research questions, the results can be summarized as follows:
A1 The amount of cross-domain connections is substantial:
most websites require tens of connections to other do-
mains than the domains on which the sites are located.
A2 Mixed content delivery occurs, although most of the
cross-domain connections are done through HTTPS.
A3 Many cross-domain connections are initiated to known
web advertisement servers, but a much larger amount
traces to social media platforms such as Facebook and
cloud infrastructures such as the one provided by Google.
A4 The answers A1, A2, and A3 differ somewhat between
popular Finnish websites and globally popular sites.
Particularly the Finnish sample aligns well with previous
observations regarding Google’s almost perfect penetration
across the current Web [10]. When visiting a popular Finnish
website, the probability is very close to one that some traces
are left to Google’s servers. Even when a user is not willing to
voluntarily participate in the Facebook’s Panopticon [28], the
probability is nearly 0.8 for involuntary traces to appear also
in Facebook’s servers upon visiting a popular Finnish website.
As social media platforms are under increasing scrutiny
particularly in Europe, further empirical research is required
not only for examining privacy questions on the client-side,
but also for extending the questions toward regulatory aspects
and the concept of forced trust. For further research on the
side of implicit trust and security, it seems prolific to turn
the attention toward the actual source code of the JavaScript
possibly loaded from unknown third-parties via known parties.
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